Due to the current gap in continued funding from the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF), the NSF Unidata Program Center has temporarily paused most operations. See NSF Unidata Pause in Most Operations for details.
Due to the current gap in continued funding from the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF), the NSF Unidata Program Center has temporarily paused most operations. See NSF Unidata Pause in Most Operations for details.
Likewise, checking the tombstones via local forecast on weather.gov resulted in "N/A" for most zip codes I tried during the outage.
From an IT side, I would say this particular event should help illustrate the foolhardy paradigm of "putting all your eggs in one basket." HPC, NCEP, EMC . . . all were hit with this outage. NWWS, EMWIN, and SBN were all down. A primary and secondary router paradigm in the same physical location may save lots of money, but is an incredible liability for data distribution.
I have always advocated that a live secondary should be placed geographically distant from the primary uplink and NCF . . . and KC has legacy and national networking infrastructure already in place to make it a likely candidate. Or Boulder, at ESRL.
Not that my comments will merit any action, but if pointing out what seems obvious to me gains traction, that would be great. I would even start filling out my TPS cover sheets for all my memos, and coming in on over the weekend to work. ("Office Space" reference)
Stonie On 02/14/2017 03:17 PM, Gilbert Sebenste wrote:
Here it is: NWS Statement on Cause of Outage on Feb. 13 Feb. 14, 2017 The National Weather Service experienced a failure of its AWIPS Network Control Facility communications network at 2:08 p.m. EST Feb 13. The outage, lasting two hours, 36 minutes, prevented us from fully distributing forecasts and warnings. During the outage, the public was able to access forecasts, watches and warnings by NOAA Weather Radio and the social media accounts of their local forecast office. Technicians quickly determined the cause of the problem was the simultaneous failure of two core communications routers - primary and backup - for the control facility due to a power problem. The routers were replaced and the system was restored to full service. We are still investigating what caused the power outage. The AWIPS communications system is a very reliable configuration and this is the first time both routers failed simultaneously. We are implementing additional communication pathways to the backup Network Control Facility to ensure that problems encountered in switching operations to this backup facility will not recur. --- *Gilbert Sebenste* Staff Meteorologist Environmental Health and Safety Labs for Wellness 154 | DeKalb, Illinois 60115 815-753-5492 _gilbert@xxxxxxx <mailto:gilbert@xxxxxxx>_ http://weather.admin.niu.edu <http://weather.admin.niu.edu/> Everyone. Home. Safely. NIU _______________________________________________ NOTE: All exchanges posted to Unidata maintained email lists are recorded in the Unidata inquiry tracking system and made publicly available through the web. Users who post to any of the lists we maintain are reminded to remove any personal information that they do not want to be made public. ldm-users mailing list ldm-users@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx For list information or to unsubscribe, visit: http://www.unidata.ucar.edu/mailing_lists/
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